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How NATIONS BEHAVE.* 2d ed. By Louis Henkin. New York: 
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Columbia Uni-
versity Press. 1979. Pp. xv, 400. $25. 
In the first edition of How Nations Behave (1968), Professor 
Louis Henkin sought to provide a realistic analysis of the importance 
of international law. No mere restatement of "existing usage," 1 it 
probed how and why nations at different times have obeyed, vio-
lated, and sought to modify international legal norms. In the second 
edition of How Nations Behave, Professor Henkin incorporates the 
teachings of world politics during the momentous decade from 1968 
to 1978. After analyzing the modern changes in the character and 
observance of international law, he reaffirms his thesis that the foun-
dations of international law have survived and that they continue to 
influence national conduct. 
Both editions of How Nations Behave respond to a classic criti-
cism of international law - that it fails to influence the behavior of 
nations because it lacks effective central legislative or enforcement 
mechanism, and thus it cannot be called "law" at all. Some of these 
arguments, Professor Henkin points out, derive from superficial 
comparison of international law to domestic law. As H.L.A. Hart 
has observed, "[t]he rules for states resemble that simple form of so-
cial structure, consisting only of primary rules of obligation, which, 
when we find it among societies of individuals, we are accustomed to 
contrast with a developed legal system."2 Both Hart and Henkin 
warn of the dangers of such comparisons. For example, it might be 
tempting to say that observance of international law is "voluntary," 
while compliance with domestic law is "mandatory." Yet Henkin 
shows that the decision to observe domestic law can also be seen as 
voluntary. Thus, we may choose to breach a contract and risk liabil-
ity for damages; we may even commit criminal acts if the possible 
benefits outweigh the expected cost (punishment) (p. 97). 
One might try to refine the generalization; one might assert that 
observance of international law is especially voluntary because the 
absence of any effective enforcement mechanism eliminates all costs 
of breach. But this argument assumes that the threat of punishment 
is a prerequisite to law observance. Henkin rejects that fallacy. 
Most people eschew crime not so much because they fear punish-
ment as because they are deterred by the moral force of the law -
the opprobrium attached to violation. And our experience with pro-
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hibition gives complementary evidence that respect for law is deter-
mined only in small part by the existence of an enforcement 
mechanism. Professor Henkin believes that nations observe law not 
primarily because of the threat of sanctions, but because of other 
forces: a common interest in orderly friendly relations; a desire for 
reciprocal treatment; a dislike of criticism; and a fear of the victim's 
response (pp. 50-53). Domestic forces - the extent to which a na-
tion's institutions accept international law, or the importance of in-
ternational lawyers in a state department - may also influence a 
nation's tendency to observe the law (pp. 60-68). Nations violate law 
because policy-making is irrational or uninformed (p. 68), or be-
cause rational analysis indicates that the benefits of a particular vio-
lation outweigh the expected cost (pp. 69-74). But this calculus of 
cost and benefit encompasses costs to the integrity of the law itself, 
and to the stability, order, and climate of reciprocity it provides. 
Thus we gauge the true cost inaccurately if we focus simply on the 
formal sanctions the law may provide: 
What matters is not whether the international system has legislative, 
judicial, or executive branches, corresponding to those we have become 
accustomed to seek in domestic society; what matters is whether inter-
national law is reflected in the policies of nations and in relations be-
tween nations. The question is not whether there is an effective 
legislature; it is whether there is law that responds and corresponds to 
the changing needs of a changing society. The question is not whether 
there is an effective judiciary, but whether disputes are resolved in an 
orderly fashion in accordance with international law. Most important, 
the question is not whether law is enforceable or even effectively en-
forced; rather, whether law is observed, whether it governs or influ-
ences behavior, whether international behavior reflects stability and 
order. [P. 26.] 
Two new sections in the second edition study how the new prom-
inence of emerging Third World nations has affected international 
"stability and order." Henkin notes that, as part of their quest to 
establish a "new international economic order" (p. 199), the emerg-
ing nations have worked to change many traditionally accepted in-
ternational norms. As part of their effort to "narrow the gulf 
between rich and poor states" (p. 199), they have developed their 
own agenda for new law. They seek to establish the principle of 
economic self-determination, which requires national control over 
the exploitation of natural resources. As a corollary, they reject 
traditional norms requiring compensation for nationalized property, 
norms they believe confer unjust advantages on capital-exporting 
states (p. 198). They would also like to formulate international con-
ventions barring racial discrimination and economic exploitation 
(pp. 197-98). As part of their drive for an international economic 
order based on welfare principles rather than on market forces, they 
also propose to limit the vast powers of multinational corporations 
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by creating international regulatory agencies, international antitrust 
laws, and international chartering mechanisms (pp. 203-04). 
Henkin contrasts this agenda with what he sees as the agenda of 
the developed nations. Because they are "reasonably content" with· 
the status quo (p. 194), they reject the norms proposed by the devel-
oping nations. They would prefer to preserve the traditional eco-
nomic norms and to build a new consensus on the control of nuclear 
proliferation, international terrorism, population growth, and pollu-
tion. 
To illustrate the clash between these agendas, Professor Henkin 
includes a new chapter discussing the attempts to remake the Law of 
the Sea. He traces the progress of the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conferences and concludes that however the new law is finally for-
mulated, it will "reflect less the narrow wishes of superpowers than 
the growing influences and solidarity of the Third World" (p. 226). 
He also believes that because the United Nations General Assembly 
has declared the seabed beyond national jurisdiction to be the "com-
mon heritage of mankind" (p. 215), Third World nations will con-
tinue trying to develop "new institutions which they might control 
and thereby extend their authority and preclude that of developed 
states in the large oceans . . ." (pp. 226-27). 
In yet another new chapter, Professor Henkin discusses the role 
of ·the new agendas in the developing international law of human 
rights. He charts the evolution of these norms from early diplomatic 
immunity to the modem guarantees of the United Nations Charter, 
the Universal Declaration, and the Conventions on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, Economic and Social Rights, Genocide, and Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (pp. 229-35). Henkin notes 
trends toward acknowledgement of a right to economic self-determi-
nation (p. 232), and toward linking other political and economic 
agreements with human rights demands, as in the Helsinki Accords 
(p. 237). 
Finally, Professor Henkin expands his section on "The Law in 
Operation" beyond its original discussion of the Suez Crisis, the 
Eichmann case, and the Cuban Quarantine, to include an analysis of 
the Vietnam War. In this chapter he lays out three conceptual mod-
els of the Vietnam conflict: (1) a civil war in South Vietnam, with 
aid to the opposing sides from North Vietnam and the United States; 
(2) a civil war in Vietnam, between North and South, with U.S. in-
tervention on the side of the South; or (3) an invasion of South Viet-
nam by North Vietnam with U.S. assistance to South Vietnam (pp. 
306-08). The United Nations Charter, in Article 2(4), prohibits the 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state; as Professor Henkin explains, each model of the Viet-
nam War yields a different set of violations. In domestic systems, a 
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superior authority determines facts and applies norms, but in the in-
ternational arena we cannot determine whether a violation has oc-
curred unless there is a consensus among nations on the 
interpretation of events. 
Nations are likely to continue justifying their actions by "inter-
pretation"; the Iranian government's characterization of the Ameri-
can Embassy hostages as "spies," and the Soviet Union's claim that 
it was "invited" into Afghanistan are convenient examples. Still, 
some current events give hope for an international consensus on the 
interpretation of such conduct: although outside intervention in an 
internal war is one of the hardest cases for rules of international law 
(p. 311), the United Nations General Assembly was able to reach a 
consensus when it voted overwhelmingly to condemn the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan. 
The second edition of How Nations Behave has something for 
everyone interested in international law and foreign policy. For the 
novice, it summarizes and responds to classic arguments against the 
existence and importance of international law, illustrating with his-
torical and contemporary examples the ways in which law influences 
the foreign policy of nations. For the scholar, it is another valuable 
addition to the Henkin collection. Its new sections, like the founda-
tion they join, display a breadth of experience and thoughtfulness; its 
nearly fifty pages of notes provide a rich resource for further study. 
